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The political changes that are going on in East Europe since 1989 
have incited a wide interest in several fields of political science. 
(1) Comparative studies on transitions to democracy are popular 
and numerous, and fit into a wide, already existing literature. (2) 
In this tradition, the emphasis is laid, almost exclusively, on 
studies of the central organs and institutions of government: the 
role of political leadership, the establishment of the new party 
systems, the working of the parliament, the performance of the 
new government, and so on. There is much less interest in the re­
organisation of local political or public life.
This assessment of the relative importance of the two spheres 
seems to be almost obvious. The hierarchy established between 
local and central politics, just like between local and national or 
international history', is one of the oldest traditions in academic 
life. One could also argue that the special circumstances of the East 
European case only underline the importance of this distinction. In 
the former, centralised system, the subordination of local 
authorities to the central organs was strict and extensive. 
Therefore, the establishment of a new system can only be done 
from the centre. In this way, in the field of politics, the central 
dilemma of economic reform is repeated: for a market economy, 
private property and propertied classes are required: but in the 
present state of affairs, it is only the state that can "create" 
private property. The very making of the actors of a decentralised 
economy becomes a task for central authorities. (3)
Moreover, this paper, and the research project of which it is a 
part, has a particularly strong theoretical interest. One could study 
changes at the level of local politics on its own right. But this is not 
the aim of this project that wants to re-pose some of the 
fundamental questions, at the level of methodology and even 
political philosophy, related to the possibility and the modality of 
political and social change; that tries to develop an approach to 
study continuities and discontinuities in transitions. From this 



























































































-  2 -
only even more pronounced. It is taken almost as an evidence that 
theoretical studies should focus on the central organs, working 
more closely with problems of general relevance, while studies of 
local government and local changes are more concrete, descriptive, 
less abstract. Yet, the particular way this project poses its 
theoretical and methodological questions suggested to reverse the 
established wisdom, and set out to study the process of change at 
the local level. The perspective of this paper is given by the 
problem of legacy.
The choice of this issue as a starting point may look dubious for at 
least two different reasons. First, the question of legacy is very' 
much present in current discussions. But it is contained in political 
propaganda speeches, in justifications of particular actions, in 
blaming of the opponents, the others - always the others! - of 
being communists either in form or in substance. It is present in 
journal articles and interviews, in media talks and presentations. 
It has been so much abused and trivialised that any further 
reference to the "communist past" seems to be devoid of value 
and sense.
But there is an even stronger reason to leave the whole question 
of legacy: the need for pragmatism, for attention to real, concrete 
problems, and forget about rhetorical, de-constructive debates 
about the "meaning" and the "truth" of the past. This approach 
looks extremely sympathetic, and is only reinforced by the 
current, low level of the discussion on "communist legacy". If only 
this attitude could be accepted without reservations; if the current 
situation in East Europe would be compatible with such an 
outlook. However, it is disqualified in the most obvious way, in the 
simplest manner in which the value of a pragmatic approach is 
tested: it does not work. It does not work, as the two poles 
presented above are not arguments reinforcing each other for the 
choice of one of the alternatives (the "good" pragmatism 
reinforced by the "bad" discourse of legacy), but two instances of a 
vicious circle. If we look at the events of the last few years in 



























































































-  3 -
take as a starting point, we'll arrive at the other, and back to the 
first, without making any advance.
Thus, if we start as adherents of the first view, as ardent accusers 
of the communists for all present wrongs, then we'll find that this 
has no end. We'll encounter communists everywhere - in 
governmental posts, in the central and local administration, in 
schools, and we'll realise that most of the enterprises are still run 
by "communists", whether in the state sector, or salvaged into the 
private sphere. After a time, anyone who has just a bit of sense 
will realise the futility of this witch-hunt, and opt for a pragmatist 
position: let us forget about the communists, all that matters is 
expertise, and of getting things done. However, as soon as this is 
accepted, one will realise that things simply cannot be 
accomplished, that nothing is working properly, that again and 
again, one stumbles into the legacies of the past in the most 
unexpected places and manners. Nothing is left, but joining again 
the chorus for "getting finally rid of communism".
If one is starting from the opposite end, the same circle emerges, 
only run through different phases. Here, one starts with the claim 
for a complete tabula rasa, with an attitude of forgiving and 
forgetting: let us not even mention the past. However, one is soon 
realising that such a naive attitude does not lead anywhere, as 
business as usual is most often done still in the old fashion; and 
even when there are changes, more often than not these are 
simply peculiar inflexions of the old manners, only combined now 
with extreme rudeness and cynicism, nothing resembling a 
genuine civil society. So, one is changing to the opposite extreme, 
and goes around blaming the communists. But one will soon 
realise that this will not be of much help. Thus comes the return 
of pragmatism, by that time combined with the "proper" degree of 
cynicism, and a settling with the idea that it is not possible to 
change anything.
The main purpose of this paper, and of the whole research project, 
is to find a way to overcome this impasse. Let us start with two 



























































































-  4  -
necessary to gain some distance, both from current political life 
and the discursive formulations that accompany it, whether in the 
sphere of politics, journalism, or (pseudo-scientific) political 
commentaries; and second, it is necessary to take the issue of 
legacy seriously. It seems that what unites, among other things, 
the two approaches to the question of legacy mentioned above is 
that they both fail to take it seriously into account: one by side­
stepping it, while the other by the all-too-easy solution offered. 
This paper has a different starting point: it proposes to bracket 
the problem of the legacy temporarily, and to take instead as the 
direct object of analysis the discourse on legacy.
As a first step, let us look into some facts; the most simple, 
objective facts, about which there is no controversy. The first 
concerns the present state of affairs in political life which is 
judged insufficient not only by its protagonists or by the 
population at large and political commentators within the 
countries, but by practically all serious external observers. (4) 
Many of the high expectations voiced in 1989 were obviously 
unfounded. But even the worst scenarios did not picture not only 
in 1989, but even before and after that year, what followed the 
collapse of communist rule: the incomprehensible war in 
Yugoslavia, the kaleidoscope of local conflicts in the former Soviet 
Union, or the near-paralysis of political life in Hungary and 
Poland, especially concerning its ugly rhetoric. All this leads to the 
conclusion that the presence of legacy is undeniable; it does make 
a difference today, therefore all pragmatic approaches must take 
into account.
The second point, even more important for our purposes, concerns 
the effect of the current discourse on legacy. The aim of any 
discourse is to provide an answer, a solution. This has certainly 
not happened in case of this discourse. It led to nowhere, though, 
as the previous paragraph made it evident, the problem which it 
tried to address was real. The effective impact of the concrete 
discourse was to render impossible the serious addressing of this 
issue; it led to a paralysis of thinking, an immunisation against the 



























































































-  5 -
The bracketing of the direct discussion therefore gave us a 
significant result. Instead of taking sides in current debates on 
legacy, it is necessary to take the state of the whole discussion as 
a symptom. This suggests that if we have a symptom, we can also 
talk about a disease. But is there a point in using medical 
analogies in political discourse? Is it not a return to an of obsolete 
biologism that has been long surpassed in the development of 
both political science and sociology? But, as a matter of principle, 
medicine is not same thing as biology; and concretely, there are a 
number of indications that medical analogies may be particularly 
helpful in analysing the current East-European situation.
First of all, the use of such medical, as opposed to biological, 
analogies would not be out of contact with some analyses of the 
socialist systems, made before their demise. Elemer Hankiss, who 
has written a number of highly influential articles and books 
during the last ten years of the regime, has very-’ often used such 
analogies, especially in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. (5) 
Both his arguments and imagery indicated that in his view', 
contemporary Hungarian society was not simply under foreign or 
domestic oppression, but was an entity that wore symptoms of 
profound sickness. Eventual recovery required the proper 
diagnosis of this sickness, that was not at all obvious, and required 
new tools; tools that were different from both the Marxist and 
liberal vocabularies widespread before and after 1989.
Second, some of the terms, often used with respect to the 
transition process, should be finally taken seriously. The first is 
that of "regime", and the difference between a political "system" 
and a political "regime". (6) Today, the term "regime", when 
applied in political discourse, has an overwhelmingly negative 
connotation. The specificity of this all-too-obvious point can be 
understood by paying attention to the original meaning of the 
term. According to the OED, "regime" first of all means "the 
regulation of such matters as have an influence on the 
preservation or restoration of health; a particular course of diet, 



























































































-  6 -
It refers to a whole manner of regulating existence, of what 
people do, and not simply a way to overcome an illness. Due to the 
frequent borrowing of medical analogies in political life, "regime" 
or "regimen" was applied through centuries in political discourse, 
but only in the very specific sense of regulation, and not applied 
to the form of political rule until the French Revolution. It was 
only in 1792 that retrospectively, it was used for the former 
system of rule, due to the widespread influence it exercised over 
various spheres of life (see especially the well-known expression 
"Ancien regime"). Since then, whenever the term "regime" is 
applied to a political system, these two (positive and normative) 
aspects are interwoven: a "regime" is a type of political rule that 
extends to all spheres of existence; therefore, it is not simply a 
political system, and is to be condemned.
In current political discourse, the term "regime" has lost its 
specificity, as part of a much broader trend of linguistic 
imprecision. In a supposedly positive science, the terminology 
applied to political systems, or forms of government, devolved 
into a peculiar duality of good and bad, where all terms used for 
"bad" forms of government were indiscriminately lumped 
together (tyranny, dictatorship, despotism, regime). The word 
"regime" became applied to all type of political systems, therefore 
the finer, but ultimately more important questions about the 
partial survival, the lasting impacts of a particular system were 
lost. However, for the East European countries, the term "regime" 
is to be used in the original, medical sense. Communism was not 
just a political system, but a "regime" that defined, succeeding 
even in its failure, the whole mode of living in the country. 
Therefore, if the rejection of Communism is to be taken seriously, 
it is necessary not only to change the political system, but to 
change the "regime": the way people are living, to the extent that 
this has been and is still shaped by communist practices. Italy 
today may need a change in its political system, but nobody is 
proposing a change of the "regime" of the country, in the old 
medical sense of the term. In East Europe, it is exactly this change 



























































































-  7 -
The second medical term to take seriously is the expression "shock 
therapy". In its contemporary use, this term is has a very narrow 
meaning. Restricted to the sphere of economics, it is interpreted in 
the sense of a stabilisation policy, and is impregnated by a 
profound belief in the "market". The proponents of "shock 
therapy" have an ideological conviction that the market is the only 
solution to any social or political ills; that the proper and complete 
reliance upon the market or market forces is at once a sufficient 
and necessary condition for the government of social and political 
life, implying that "health" is equivalent to a correct system of 
prices. However, a proper attention to the terms could help to 
relate this debate to a much broader context. First, the word 
"therapy" is taken again from medicine, with the very precise 
meaning of curing. There is a revealing difference between "shock 
therapy" and simple measures of economic policy; the idea that in 
this case, the question is not merely a discussion of alternatives, 
or the correction of an earlier policy, by rational means and 
calculations, but the prescription of a specific course of affairs 
beyond matters of policy: it is the prescription of a change of 
regime.
The expression itself, therefore, if we strip it from the economic 
ideology in which it is enveloped, seem to be particularly 
adequate to the current situation in East Europe. How to operate 
such a change of regime, and who are those that these changes are 
primarily targeting? It is here that the other word of the 
expression gains importance. The change has to be quick, sudden, 
a rapid overthrow of the established order of things.
The first question to answer concerns the level at which this 
operation is to take place. Is this the whole society, beyond the 
political order? If this were the case, then we would encounter a 
serious problem. It would amount to a simple preaching of 
revolution, the phenomenon that has been rejected by all political 
and moral philosophers who ever considered applying medical 
analogy to social life, and a return to the very idea of revolution 
whose validity has been questioned, it seems, for ever, by the 



























































































-  8 -
understand why proponents of shock therapy are often called 
"liberal Bolsheviks".
But this whole discussion seems to be out of place. The target of 
the revolution was always the social or political order, while the 
target of the free marketers is individual human conduct. They 
are quite properly following the medical analogy implied in the 
expression "shock therapy": there is no reference to social and 
political factors, the focus is exclusively on single individuals. A 
"shock therapy", in the medical sense, means the pulling out, by a 
sudden movement, an individual from a state of being that is sick, 
and that the given individual, left on Its own, is unable to leave.
Let us conclude the discussion so far. By taking the issue of legacy 
seriously, and its current discussion as only a symptom, we were 
led to the realisation that in spite of the changes in the political, 
legal, and economic systems, the countries of East Europe are still 
manifesting symptoms of a profound "sickness", due not simply to 
the previous political system, but the "regime"; a kind of 
"sickness" that they are not only unable to overcome, but even 
come to terms with it; that prevents its own diagnosis from the 
inside.
The next point to be discussed concerns the concrete diagnosis. 
The easiest solution would be to follow upon the expressions 
"social body", or "body politick", so often used in the history of 
thought, before and after Hobbes. However, that would lead us too 
far into using metaphors. This paper suggests a different road, 
more consistent with the interpretation given here on "shock 
therapy" and "regime": the "sickness" concerns not the social body, 
not even the individual soul, but the will.
This point can be elaborated using a text of Seneca. (9) He calls 
this sickness of the will stultitia . This state that has three 
characteristics. First, one who has this sickness is unable to stand 
straight, is moved by all sorts of external influences, is not able to 
select, to separate, to discriminate; is open to "all winds". (10) 
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is unable to give unity to his existence, is without memory, is in a 
state of perpetual change, fluidity. Finally, he/ she is unable to 
focus his will, as does not possess a proper relationship to himself; 
is not free in his will. The emphasis is placed on this last point: the 
relation to oneself, the problématisation of the link between self 
and will.
Its absence, stultitia , has a peculiar characteristic: it is impossible 
not only to change, but even to notice it from the inside. A 
diagnosis implies both a knowledge of what is healthy, and a will 
to change. In the condition of stultitia, it is this knowledge and 
will that are missing. This suggests an answer to the problem we 
started with, as post-communist countries show all signs of a 
"disease" that they are not even able to address.
However, at this point, it seems that our analysis led to a 
impossible position. We arrived at the diagnosis of a lack of a will 
to change, even pretending to claim that such a will could not 
even exist; and yet, there are all signs to show that the majority of 
the population of these countries in fact opted for the change, 
whenever they had a chance to express their opinions. The three 
most significant instances are Solidarity in 1979-81 in Poland; the 
second economy in Hungary', since the 1970s; and the events of 
1989-1990, culminating in the first free elections and the 
overwhelming votes for change. These three points are important 
not only as facts showing the will to end communist rule, but also 
since they served as the major reference points for practically all 
external and internal analysts to side-step the significance of 
communist rule, and, in spite of all reason to the contrary, to 
consider it as a simple form of despotic government that can be 
swept away without a trace. For different reasons, this naive 
scenario overwhelmed even the few acute observers of the 
situation: Solidarity became a fairly tale especially for the socialist 
left, already under strong pressures due to the Gulag-effect; the 
"second economy" was believed to be the stepping stone for a real 
market economy and civil society by many; (11) while the 



























































































-  10  -
whole media world, saddened just a year earlier by pictures of 
Tienanmen square.
However, the modality of these changes, especially the peculiar 
fall of the system could be also used to support an opposite 
scenario: communism broke down when the gap between 
communists and non-communists became almost invisible; where 
it no longer had any difference to erase, could no longer find 
motivation, fuel for its activity. It is this hypothesis that serves as 
the guiding thread for the research project pursued since the late 
1980s which this paper is part of. Such a perspective is no doubt 
much less popular, and is also more difficult to substantiate, than 
other available theoretical and ideological positions that provide 
easy diagnoses and clear blueprints for the future. Also, it 
requires, beyond the search for the guilty, or self-culpabilisation, 
the explicit incorporation of self-reference. Yet, it was the pursuit 
of this path that intellectual honesty, understood in the sense of 
Nietzsche and Weber, required.
Such an approach means, instead of applying existing frameworks 
on transitions in a concrete empirical study, or being engaged in a 
normative undertaking about the desirable roads, or even 
criticising the existing approaches and policies, the pursuit of a 
dual path. First, it was necessary to do theoretical and 
methodological research about the way in which, beyond the 
taken for granted assumptions of the literature, a serious study 
(i.e. one incorporating self-reference) of continuity and 
discontinuity at the level of daily experiences would be possible.
(12) Second, empirical studies must be done to assess the real 
continuities and discontinuities at the level of daily existence; 
studies that keep a distance from actual political life, but that 
nevertheless try to stay, as close as it is possible or desirable, to 
current events. This is the reason why this highly theoretical 
project chose to study changes in local government as its topic.
(13)
The concrete line of investigation was the following. The target of 



























































































-  11 -
creation of politics, but the precondition of democratic politics: the 
formation (or re-formation) of the political body itself - the polity. 
Such a study could be pursued in two different ways. One could 
start from the top, focusing on the centre of decision-making, the 
elite, and investigate the attempts to create and shape this 
political body. Alternatively, one may emphasise the grass-roots, 
movements and processes started from below. However, this 
project selected a third, intermediate road: the study of the 
formation of local elites, particularly the newly elected mayors.
This choice can be supported by a number of reasons, the main 
being, in line with the arguments presented in the Introductory' 
section, the legacy of the past. On the one hand, In one sense, the 
former regime was truly unique and successful: it has effectively 
destroyed the previous social, political, and economic elites. The 
result is that currently there is no elite in these countries that 
could take up on itself the role of the building of the polity: a real 
elite itself has to be created, which may well be the most difficult 
element in the whole transition process. On the other hand, due to 
the systematic mis-civilising or de-civilising and de-moralising 
project of the former regime, one cannot rely upon whatever 
comes from below with full confidence, as truly "grass-roots" 
movements often only reproduce, now without external 
conditioning, the worst aspects of the former regime. This 
suggested us the choice of mayors: a group of people who, as 
opposed to much of the current intellectual and political 
discussions taking place in the centre, do know what they are 
talking about, and in general lack the ideological garbage; but who 
are also members of a new elite, possessing in the majority of 
cases the real confidence of people who voted for them, and 
standing in fact out of their environment.
The central part of the previous line of arguments can perhaps be 
reformulated in a programmatic proposition: the only possible 
way out of the vicious circle left by the communist legacy is 
provided neither in the hope of new groups or parties taking over 
the centre and devising new and new global programmes, nor by 



























































































-  12  -
popular sentiments, expectations and wills, but by re-building 
manifold and multilayered elites: a process that in this particular 
sense must rely upon the responsibility of each and every 
individual - toward others, but also oneself.
This paper contains a first, descriptive analysis of some of the 
main findings of the survey. (13) A number of different items 
will be analysed, all having a common focus: the emphasis on the 
creation, the building of the very field in which political activities 
could be performed. In the analysis, we'll try to check whether 
the will to contribute to the solution of problems that are common 
for a locality exist, to assess the extent to which it is damaged, and 
to map the circle between the problems of will, and the scarcity of 
the means at disposal to achieve the end.
2. The point of entry
As the focus is on the formation of the very field of politics, social 
background variables assume a smaller role, even on theoretical 
grounds. Some available empirical evidence also supports the 
claim that social background is of less an influence than in a 
contemporary Western setting. (14) Instead, two points will be 
reviewed here in some detail: the motivation to make the decision 
to run, and previous experience with public office.
2.1. The motivation to run
For external observers, the high degree of political apathy that 
characterises several post-communist countries defies 
comprehension. One expected that the fall of communist 
dictatorship would be followed by a strong sense of relief, and an 
upsurge of activity. However, considering the trajectory of the 
former system, the phenomenon looks rather obvious. (15) In 
light of this, it is well worth starting our overview with the 
question of what made people decide to run for a mayoral seat. 
There were two points in our interviews that provided 
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degree of the re-election of former local council heads, the high 
level of continuity - or inertia - at this level of local politics, 
making the study of mayors a particularly relevant area for a 
study of legacy. (16) The second was that our interviewees quite 
often stated that they only got their position accidentally, by 
yielding to external pressures, or due to a lack of proper 
candidates. The question was to what extent could these findings 
be verified, not simply at the level of the continuity in the job, but 
also that of the "subjective" reasons given for the decision to run.
On the basis of the interviews, seven reasons were listed in a set. 
The option for "other" reasons was also open, but in all three 
countries, only about 10% of the respondents chose this 
possibility. The first striking thing in the response patterns of all 
three countries was the relatively low level of initiative taken by 
the respondents. First, a high proportion of respondents (1/4 to 
1/3 in each country) were asked by local organisations. Second, 
about the same proportion in Hungary and Slovakia - mostly the 
former council heads - just stated that they have continued their 
previous experience with local public affairs. Third, however, the 
call to enter the race did not come from national politics. In all 
countries, there was practically none who had a specifically 
political career in his mind when making this selection, (17) and 
the influence of national political organisations was also 
minuscule, ranging from negligible in Hungary (2%) to small 
Slovakia (7%), the latter being due to the remaining power of the 
Communist Party and its local organisations.
Of the personal reasons, a relatively high percentage stated "the 
desire to solve problems related to the whole community" in 
Hungary and the Czech republic (around 30%); much less so in 
Slovakia (18%). This statement does give a personal motive, 
related to the affairs of the whole community, but has a somewhat 
dubious ring in the context of East Europe. After 40 years of 
communism, it is hardly possible to talk about the "common 
interest" or the "public good" without raising suspicions. The 
remaining two items, both expressly stating a default choice 



























































































-  14  -
have been politically or professionally incompetent), were 
selected by a non-negligible minority. This was the smallest in 
Hungary, 8.7% altogether, divided more or less evenly between 
political and professional reasons. In the other two countries, the 
percentages are higher, and the distribution uneven. In the Czech 
republic, a considerable proportion of respondents (12%) decided 
to run in order to prevent the post to be taken up by a politically 
unsuitable person, and half as many for professional reasons; 
while in Slovakia, the terms were changed, preference being given 
to professional deficiency (8% vs. 5%).
In the perspective of this paper, the previous discussion gave two 
rather surprising findings. First, most current mayors ran for their 
seat not driven by a concrete, positive purpose, a deliberate 
decision, an act of will, but were swept or kept there by external 
circumstances. Second, there was a decisive absence of political 
career considerations, as if politics was still a four-letter word. 
Under such conditions, one can hardly speak of the presence of a 
will so necessary to create the absent sphere of politics.
2.2. Former public office
Three variables were used to tap the dimension of continuity and 
discontinuity at the level of former political activity and 
intentions (communist party membership, the filling of public 
offices, and prior thinking about taking up a public function). The 
responses gave two major results. First, they reconfirmed a 
relatively high level on continuity in personnel in all three 
countries. This was the highest in Hungary, with half of the 
mayors being formerly members of the communist party, and 2/3 
of them altogether taking up some public role before. The 
Slovakian numbers are almost exactly the same, and even in the 
Czech republic, 1/4 of the mayors were party members, and 46% 
of them public office-holders in the former system.
Second, the contrasting of the questions about filling a public 
office and thinking about taking up such a position pointed out an 



























































































-  15  -
many respondents who actually took up public offices than those 
who ever thought about filling such positions. This fact leads us 
beyond the previous section. There, the problem was the refusal 
to enter politics; here, we add the same attitude concerning any 
public role, when we already know that such offices were not 
connected to considerations of political career. How to make sense 
of this peculiar fact?
Let us first have a look at a simple 2x2 table of the two variables 
of former public function and the consideration of taking up such 
a function. One of the four cells should be relatively empty: those 
who have never thought about taking up an office, but actually 
having filled one. However, apart from the two options defining a 
correspondance of thought and action (never being in office, and 
not even thinking about, and both thinking about and actually 
filling it), one would expect a relatively high portion of those who 
were thinking about this possibility, only never having the 
opportunity to do so in the past. This cell could indicate the 
strength of a potential pool of a new political elite: individuals 
who had the will to take part in public life, but considered the 
price to be paid under the existing system too high, and were de 
facto elected in the first free elections.
Table 1. Public activity and deliberation
Number of thought of taking up public function
mayors who:
HU CZ SL
filled YES NO YES NO YES NO
public YES 72 74 29 84 51 90
role NO 12 66 21 112 16 72
In all three countries, the results were the exact opposite of the 
expected (see Table 1). Everywhere, of the four cells, by far the 
smallest number of respondents were in the one specified by the 
presence of thinking and the absence of activity; while the 
opposite cell was the largest in both Hungary and Slovakia, and 



























































































-  16  -
our mayors were considering taking up a public function before, 
without actually doing so, and a very high proportion never ever 
thought of such a move, but actually ended up filling it. One could 
expect the former cell being much larger, but there were 4-5 
times more cases in the latter.
In order to explain this rather perplexing result, another variable 
was brought into the analysis, former communist party 
membership. This variable, not surprisingly, was quite strongly 
related to former political activity. The question was the extent to 
which it could explain the surprising results discussed in the 
previous paragraphs.
The following hypotheses were formulated in advance.
1. Those who were both politically active in the past system and 
were planning this activity in advance should mostly be former 
party members, while those who were "apolitical" on all counts in 
the past should be former non-members. In other words, among 
party members, the first cell should predominate over the second, 
while among non-party-members, we expect the opposite.
2. Those few who were actually thinking about political activity, 
but never took up actual positions, should almost exclusively be 
non-party members. The opposite option - someone who was a 
party-member, thinking about political activity, yet failing to do 
so, and eventually being elected as a mayor by popular vote - 
simply does not make much sense.
3. The surprisingly many respondents who never thought about 
political activity, yet ended up doing so, should be 
overwhelmingly party members. The opposite cell again should be 
close to zero, for more or less the same reasons: why should 
someone who has not been a party member and never thought 
about taking up a public office find oneself in one?
The first hypothesis was fully confirmed in both Hungary and 
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half of the few respondents who were deliberately politically 
active were non-party members. The second hypothesis was 
upheld in all three countries. In Hungary, there wasn't a single 
respondent who was a party member, thinking about public office, 
but not fulfilling it, and in the other two countries, there were 
only a few marginal cases. The third hypothesis, however, was 
refuted everywhere. In no country was there a considerable 
difference between former party members and non-members 
among those who took up public office without premeditation. In 
Hungary and Slovakia, the differences were only slight, 60% vs. 
40% in both cases, as opposed to the hypothesised wide gap; while 
in the Czech lands, there were actually more than twice as many 
non-members among those who ended up in public positions.
Thus, even a short glimpse at the political, as opposed to social, 
background characteristics of mayors pointed out a number of 
peculiarities of both the former and the present political systems, 
peculiar continuities beyond the changes. In any advanced society, 
there are a number of public offices to be filled. The taking up of 
such a position offers both a possibility to exercise influence, 
power, authority, and is a personal honour. This assures that the 
most energetic and widely respected persons are to be selected 
for such offices, at each level. In the former socialist countries, the 
formal emphasis on filling such public roles and functions was 
even greater, the private - economic, professional, academic - 
possibilities for career were even more difficult than elsewhere. 
Still, something obviously was not working. There was a dire lack 
of supply, of volunteers for such positions. Under such 
circumstances, individuals were not selected for posts; they were 
found, convinced, and nominated. Party members, of course, were 
a primary pool of potential nominees, but non-party members 
were not exempt of this practice either. The institutional forms of 
this practice, the "cadre bank" and the "cadre development 
programmes" of the communist party have, of course, disappeared 
with the collapse of the former regime. (18) But they had a 
lasting effect: a disappearance of the political will, the absence of a 
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emerged in which politics was again possible, the political will has 
been seriously damaged. (19)
3. The ideal mayor
Before going into the actual work of mayors, let us present the 
picture they gained of their job after about two years of 
experience. We asked two questions about the "ideal mayor", one 
referring to the "best" occupational background, the other to 
personal characteristics.
On the basis of the interviews and the experiences of the former 
system, we drew a list of seven occupational categories, and asked 
our respondents to select one among them. Out of these, only 
three were chosen by more than 10% of the respondents in all 
countries: manager, economist, and lawyer; with some internal 
variation. In one case, there was almost unanimity: in all three 
countries, about 1/3 of the respondents thought that managers 
were most suited to become mayors. Concerning the other two 
professions, there was a difference in emphasis. In Hungary, there 
was a strong preference for economists over lawyers (40% vs. 
13%), while in the other two countries, the numbers were 
basically turned around, especially in the Czech republic. One 
cannot help generalising from this fact, by comparing it to the 
characteristics of the French revolutions. It is well-known that the 
1789-93 Parliament was an assembly of lawyers, while the 1830 
revolution and the subsequent July monarchy was rather 
associated with, if not economists, but financiers and bankers; 
professions quite close to the contemporary Hungarian functions 
of "economists". This difference can be interpreted in two ways. 
One could say that it shows the advantage of Hungary over the 
other countries, of being a step ahead. But the question is whether 
the first phase has been accomplished in Hungary, or only side­
stepped. (20)
The second relevant questionnaire item contained a list of eight 
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audacity, readiness to act; good nerves; patience, understanding; 
professional competence; the willingness to serve the citizens; 
generally respected personality; the ability to reach compromises; 
and thoroughness. These were the characteristics mentioned in 
our interviews, with quite surprising regularity. Respondents 
were asked to choose three characteristics. Here again, the 
differences are strong between Hungary and the other two 
countries, and are theoretically important (see Table 2).
Table 2. The characteristics of the ideal mayor
HU <2 SL
audacity 21% 64% 54%
good nerves 56 46 56
patience 41 52 51
prof, competence 43 53 62
willing to serve 52 6 11
resp personality 18 16 13
able to compromise 47 21 19
thoroughness 22 69 48
Let us start with the common points. In all countries, the overall 
distribution of responses was quite peculiar. The eight items did 
not follow the usual, even distribution, ranging from those 
accepted by the large majority through the mid-range until those 
selected only marginally, but were divided into two groups: five 
items, each selected roughly by half the respondents, and the 
other three items selected by only a small, but not insignificant 
minority of 10-20%. There were no characteristics selected either 
in the 20-40% range, or much above 60 %.
Three of the items were highly valued in all countries: good 
nerves, patience, and professional competence, the first being a 
little bit less important in the Czech lands, while the other two in 
Hungary; while one of the eight was not considered important in 
any of the countries: a well-respected personality. One a first look, 
one could be quite happy with this general picture, stating that 
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discretionary, personal characteristics of the mayors are 
underplayed, the emphasis being on receptivity, the enduring of 
the suffering of the others on the one side, and on professional 
competence on the other. Taking into account the considerations 
and results of the previous sections, however, the picture becomes 
different. It is, in fact, a very strange kind of democracy taking 
shape in front of our eyes; a system where personal activity and 
initiative, together with positive, active, generally respected 
characteristics are underplayed and replaced by two character 
traits: a saintly passivity and forbearing on the one hand, and 
mere professional competence on the other. Colours, energy, 
innovation and imagination are not only actually missing from this 
public sphere, as far as the most important common 
characteristics of all countries are concerned; they are not even 
solicited, though at stake is the re-construction of the very field of 
politics, and not simply the professional continuation of existing 
politics.
This picture is modified for the individual countries by the 
differences in the selection of the other four items. In Hungary, 
the other two items preferred by half the respondents were the 
willingness to serve the citizens and the ability to reach 
compromises. In the other two countries, however, only a small 
minority selected these two items. There the remaining two 
characteristics were selected by large numbers: audacity and 
thoroughness. This is especially true for the Czech lands, where 
both of them were selected by about 60% of all respondents; but 
even in Slovakia, the numbers are around 50%. In Hungary, these 
two personal properties lagged far behind, appealing only to a 
mere 1/5 of the sample.
For Hungary, this only reinforces what was stated in the previous 
paragraphs, making it a particularly acute case of "paralysed" 
democracy. The great dilemma of democracy, since its birth in 
ancient Greece, is the question of initiative, or ascendancy. (21) 
Democracy implies equal rights, and in the modern age, also equal 
opportunities, or at least the relative symmetry of life chances. 
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handle, stimulate, channel activity and initiative. Where this fails, 
and the equality implied in democracy extends even to this level, 
the result will be a paralysis of activity, where everybody will 
only look at the others to prevent any advance and advantage; 
ultimately, a complete and closed system of counter-selection will 
emerge. Such a system, of course, was the very fabric of socialism 
or communism, one could say. But the question today is the extent 
to which these aims, these attitudes have become ingrained 
deeply in a population, even beyond the system's existence; or to 
what extent they have become rejected now altogether, perhaps 
even excessively.
If the first problem is characteristic of Hungary, in the Slovak and 
especially the Czech cases, there are clear signs of the presence of 
this latter problem. The willingness to serve the citizens, the 
ability to reach compromises are not negative characteristics in 
themselves; quite the contrary, are necessary, internal parts of 
any democratic political system. Still, because of the connotations 
they gained in the former system, they were almost single- 
handedly rejected in these two countries.
Hungary, here again, may be one step ahead of the others. The 
problem is that it is not very clear in which direction. (22) It is 
obvious that in the communist period, these two statements 
gained the same, overwhelming, negative connotation in Hungary 
as in the other two countries. Compromises and adaptability were 
synonyms for opportunism, and the expression about serving the 
citizens smells the worst slogans of the communist party. Why, 
then, this volta face ? It is a sign of a "genuine démocratisation"? 
Or it is just a new fad, a new expectation about how to behave, 
just another sign of the democratic paralysis, an expectation of a 
general state of servility of all with respect to each, without any 
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4, The actual work of mayors
Let us start our analysis with an overall assessment. We asked our 
respondents whether their new job caused any surprise to them 
immediately. The differences were again great between the 
countries: in Hungary, there was a clear 2/3 majority of those who 
did not encounter any surprises. In the Czech republic, the 
situation was just the opposite, while Slovakia was in between, 
though closer to the Czech case, with a clear majority of those who 
were "surprised".
We performed a supplementary analysis. In order to see whether 
this difference was due to background effects, we controlled the 
results for party membership. In fact, in all three countries, 
former party members on the average were much less surprised 
by their new job than non-members, but the differences between 
the countries still remained quite strong. Thus, for e.g., still only 
40% of those mayors who have not been communist party 
members earlier expressed such a surprise in Hungary, while in 
the two parts of the former Czecho-Slovakia, even among the 
former party members, this percentage was 55-60%.
The questionnaire contained a large number of questions, many of 
them open-ended, that tried to tap in detail the actual work of 
mayors, the conflicts and problems emerging there. The present 
analysis will centre on three areas: the relation between the 
mayor and the elected body; an assessments of the obstacles 
mayors may have encountered in their work; and a short glimpse 
into the state of local ethnic conflicts.
4.1. Relations with the elected body
The way the links between the mayor, the "first citizen" of the 
community, and the elected body are established is a crucial 
question in all types of local governments with a mayoral system, 
as it has a profound impact on the possibility of solving the 
problems of the community. This is especially the case in post­
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elections, the role to be assigned to the "first man" was debated at 
length. The dilemma was the following. In the old Communist 
system, too much emphasis was placed on one-man leadership; on 
the other hand, in the new process of transition, there is a need 
for some kind of effective direction. The result was an opting for 
the mayoral system, but with strong emphasis on checks and 
balances. Therefore, considerable power was vested in the council. 
This prefigured the possibility of two types of conflicts: that of a 
"reformer" mayor vs. the conservative elected body; or of a 
conservative, "former communist" mayor vs. the newly composed 
council. (23) Second, after the elections, it turned out that a large 
part of the former "Communist" council heads were re-elected. 
This had a considerable impact on the way the government 
assessed the results of the local elections, especially in Hungary.
The questionnaire contained a series of closed items tapping 
different aspects of the relationship between the mayor and the 
elected body. In the first, we asked our respondents to 
characterise the council meetings. The results show a marked 
similarity in the three countries, with some persistent, coherent, 
and important differences. First of all, in the majority of the cases, 
the relationship between the two authorities was satisfactory in 
all three countries, though in about 10% of all cases, the meetings 
were characterised as having a very bad, even hostile atmosphere. 
Within this general trend, in Hungary the unity seems to have 
been even stronger, the solution of the problems and the conflicts 
even quicker than in the other two countries.
The second point is about the connection to national politics. Both 
concerning the level and the dynamics of this impact, the results 
are uniform and unambiguous. National politics seems to have had 
relatively little role in the local council discussions even in the 
past (the question was explicitly only about dynamics), and this 
impact is rather decreasing. In about 30% of the cases, such a link 
to politics was strong in the first period in all countries, but this 
has disappeared since, while in about 15% of the cases, this impact 
has grown since the elections. In both items, the link to national 
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Third, there was a recurrent complaint in our interviews about 
the often endless deliberations in the meetings, their frequent 
turning into "complaint-sessions", the lack of focus in the 
interventions of many council members; to problems of political 
culture in this narrow sense, referring not to general values and 
mentalities, but the more matter of fact question of how to behave 
in a public meeting, how to form and execute a proper speech. 
(24) This, in fact, turned out to be a crucial concern, left-over, 
sign of continuity or legacy, especially in the former 
Czechoslovakia, where over 50% of our respondents indicated the 
presence of this problem. In Hungary, this problem was less 
present, but still 30% of the respondents acknowledged it.
Two further questions were posed on the unity and division 
within the elected body, both of them taken out of an American 
survey of city council members, therefore providing some 
comparative data. (25) The results are coherent, reinforce and 
even help to interpret the previous findings (see Tables 3 and 4.).
Table 3. Cleavages in the local council
HU CZ SL US
- no real cleavages 61% 51% 50% 19%
- some cleavages 31 41 38 36
- strong cleavages 8 8 12 44
Table 4. Decisions made unanimously by the local councils
HU CZ SL US
> 75% of cases 69% 51% 50% 42%
- 50-75% 26 32 32 31
- 25-50% 4 11 11 14
- < 25% 1 5 7 12
According to them, it is in Hungary that the highest degree of 
unity is reigning in the local elected bodies. There are no 
cleavages in 61% of the councils, and in about 70% of the localities, 
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percentages are somewhat lower in the Czech and Slovak 
republics, both numbers being around 50% respectively. In the US, 
the differences appear not so much in the eventual decisions - the 
number is above 40% -, but concerning the cleavages. Only a small 
minority of communities (less than 20%) have elected bodies 
without strong cleavages, while in 44%, the cleavages are very 
strong (this number for the East European countries is around 
10%).
Concerning the cleavages, due to their strong dependence on 
concrete issues, it was not possible to make an exact comparative 
set; some changes had to be made even between the East 
European countries. Still, the available data offer a chance for 
indirect comparisons.
First, there is a major difference not only concerning-the number 
of localities with or without cleavages, but the number of 
cleavages actually present. In the East European case, no 
restriction was made on the number of cleavages one could have 
chosen, but the majority of those who actually stated the presence 
of any cleavages only chose one. In the US, there was a limit of 
three, but the large majority of respondents in fact made three 
selections.
Differences were also marked in the type of cleavages mentioned. 
In the US, these were mostly economic: between tax cutters and 
their opponents, supporters of businesses and of neighbourhood 
conservation, development interests and others. In the East 
European countries, on the basis of our interviews, it was difficult 
to find even issues of economic programme that divided the 
locality, and the one included in the questionnaire, about 
supporters of reliance on external capital vs. neighbourhood 
interests, was only selected by a very few respondents. Needless 
to say, this does not mean that economic questions were not 
important, but that these were not the questions that mobilised 
thinking, leading to the formulation of clear alternative 
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If the main dividing line is not economic, it should be political. It 
would even be easy to propose a simple scenario: in such 
transitions, political matters are to be settled first, and only then 
comes economics. Both the American and the East European 
questionnaires tapped national politics in two statements, one 
about party affiliation, and the other in terms of political ideology. 
Perhaps surprisingly in the tradition of the "end of ideology" 
thesis, less so if considered in the context of Reaganism, while 
party affiliation had little role in the cleavages in the US, the 
differences between liberals and conservatives were quite crucial, 
second only to economic questions. In East Europe, broadly 
speaking, the situation was the opposite. Questions of political 
ideology played a minor role everywhere. The opposition between 
liberals and "nationalists", dividing so strongly the top political 
sphere in Hungary, persisted only in a small minority of even 
those localities that actually had cleavages (taken altogether, in 
only 7% of all localities sampled was there a cleavage in the local 
council along these lines); and even in the two parts of the former 
Czecho-Slovakia, where the question was about the supporters 
and opponents of separation, interest was minimal. It is perhaps 
less surprising that such a cleavage was practically absent from 
the Czech republic, where this debate was not significant; but even 
in Slovakia, just a few months after the elections, and at the time 
when political discussions about the actual separation were at 
their height, only 12% of all respondents (and 24% of those who 
mentioned a cleavage at all) claimed that such an issue existed in 
their locality. We consider this as a good indication of the kind of 
"grass-root" importance this question had even in Slovakia.
The cleavage between left and right was exactly as marginal in 
Hungary as the previous ideological division, being selected by the 
same - small - number of respondents. There were about twice as 
many respondents selecting it in Slovakia, and three times as 
much in the Czech Republic, where this distinction was quite 
important. But, in all countries, and in distinct opposition to the 
US, affiliation to the national political parties was much more 
important than ideological belongingness. In both parts of the 
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chosen by well over half the respondents who answered this 
question. In Hungary, this proportion was much lower (34%), but 
it was still the second most important cleavage.
Finally, there was another political question, related specifically to 
the post-communist condition, the question of the survival of the 
past. This was about as important in all three countries as the 
presence of the left-right continuum, with which it was strongly 
correlated.
Politics, therefore, has in fact taken the role of economics as the 
most important source of cleavages in East Europe, especially in 
the former Czecho-Slovakia. But in Hungary, it still played a 
markedly smaller role than in the other two republics. If not 
economics and politics, then what divided most council 
representatives in Hungary? Nothing, one could say, they seem to 
be so united; and we'll return to this point in the conclusion. But 
there is one item chosen in Hungary more than in any other 
country, which is the most important reason given there: conflicts 
between the representatives of the different areas of the locality.
This finding should first be situated in a proper perspective. In no 
way is this division of an overwhelming importance in Hungary. It 
is only selected by 41% of those respondents who claimed that 
there were cleavages at all; and as a percentage of the total 
respondents, this is at the same number (around 20%) as in the US 
sample. In other words, this issue divides US and Hungarian 
localities with about the same strength; except that in Hungary, 
this is the strongest division, while in the US, there were a 
number of different economic, political, and ideological questions 
creating much stronger cleavages. It was the absence of other 
possible sources of division in Hungary that promoted this item to 
the top.
This fact can be read in two manners. It may be a sign of 
increasing parochialisation. In a country where national politics 
has discredited itself and lost all appeal, where there is no 
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localities lose inspiration, severe themselves from the centre, and 
become enclosed into their own provincial debates. This sketches 
the vision of a political field disintegrating even before it had fully 
emerged. But with the collapse of high-level politics, such a return 
to the basics, to reality, the actual conflicts of people living 
together could lead to a different result: the re-start and re- 
invigoration of political life, a new ability to handle and solve 
conflicts and debates. This is by no means a romantic return to the 
grass-roots, the traditional communities, the "local society". The 
proposal is the opposite: not the reconstruction of a former, ideal 
community, but the creation of the ability to handle conflicts. (26)
The previous discussion about the importance of politics at the 
level of local government in post-communist societies can be 
summarised in three points, forming a coherent and not very 
cheerful picture. First, local politics is weak, the very expression of 
politisation has a bad connotation, and is opposed by calls for 
unity - when, in fact, it was exactly this search for the ideal of 
unity that was characteristic of the former system. This points out 
a dual legacy at the level of political culture: due to the earlier 
lack of political and public sphere, people forgot to express 
themselves in public, and engage in a debate whose aim is not the 
elimination of the other, while the style of current top-level 
political debates only serves to reinforce a by now grass-roots will 
for "real" unity, opposed to all sorts of political divisions.
It is in the context of this search for unity that, paradoxically, the 
current processes of disintegration can be situated properly. The 
daily life of East European countries in the former system has 
been dominated by enforced, false unity kept together only by the 
communist party. At this level, there is no difference in principle 
between the Soviet empire, the false federal states, and the 
different kinds of regional administrations, going down to the 
smallest segments of local governments. Today, when all these 
entities are collapsing, we should be aware that this is done not in 
the name of division, but in the spirit of the search for unity: the 
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unity can be maintained. On the one hand, this can be denounced, 
quite correctly, as another deep legacy of communism. On the 
other, it has its analogies with Western history. The same kind of 
atomisation in search of a true source of unity happened there, 
centuries ago, leading to the eventual solution of finding the 
subject as the natural, ultimate and irreducible entity. This 
reduction (or extension) or the concept of sovereignty to the self 
finds still today expression in the concept of "consumer 
sovereignty". It is at this point that recent historical studies about 
the reinterpretation of the experience of the Western civilising 
process, and theoretical-philosophical works questioning the 
naturalistic and universalistic claims of this specific model of 
subjectivity, but not questioning its importance and value, can be 
connected to the analysis of recent East European events - with a 
promise of possible theoretical and practical gains in both regions.
Second, whatever still exists as local politics, is only some kind of 
pale reflection of national politics: second or third-rate discussions 
of the same empty, general debates that preoccupy national 
politicians. If this is all there is in "politics", one can agree that it is 
better for these debates to go unnoticed and not repeated. Finally, 
the only political issue that raises local interest is the question of 
the communist left-overs, a topic that only reinforces passivity. 
There is no political debate about programmes and alternatives, to 
stimulate thinking and acting, the facing of the existing problems. 
In this situation, the only possible source for renewal can come 
from the most down-to-earth differences: between the different 
areas of the locality. This helps to explain the current, incessant 
drive for fragmentation, and a possible, eventual mobilisation due 
to economic deprivation and inequalities. The problem is that due 
to the destruction of even the attained level of political culture, 
one can only be extremely dubious about the way such "genuine" 
conflicts will eventually be formulated.
4.2. Obstacles
Questions about the possible obstacles our respondents may have 
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the questionnaire. First, in an open question, we asked them to tell 
in a few sentences the three most memorable conflicts they had in 
their work, and then asked three closed questions on its 
evaluation. Second, a few pages later, we returned to this topic, 
but now only at a general level.
In the first occasion, we asked the mayors whether they were 
satisfied with the actual solution, whether they had the proper 
means to solve the conflicts, and if not, what were they lacking 
most. Concerning the first two, it seemed that the solution of 
actual conflicts was much more satisfactory in Hungary than in 
the other two countries. The Czech and Slovak responses were 
distributed along an almost perfect normal curve, with a slight 
skew toward more satisfaction with the actual solution, but 
dissatisfaction with the means at disposal. In Hungary, however, 
about 70% of respondents expressed satisfaction with both 
solutions and means.
Among the factors that were missing for a proper solution, the 
similarities were quite remarkable. In all three countries, there 
were two items chosen by about half the respondents: material 
resources, and the proper legal means of competence. There was 
only a slight difference of emphasis, in the direction already 
suggested by the previous results: in Hungary, economic, while in 
Slovakia and especially in the Czech lands, legal aspects were 
more problematic.
Among the remaining possible sources of conflict, there was a 
clear difference between local and national factors. In all 
countries, it was considered that the possible influence of high- 
level political influence, or the presence or absence of influence by 
the local political parties was not a major point of concern. Among 
the local factors, the relatively most important sources of trouble 
were the elected body and the own apparatus, especially in 
Slovakia. The support of local managers was less missed (present 
in about 20% of the cases in each countries), while the support of 
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The second set of questions differs from the first set in two 
respects. First, these are not connected directly to the evaluation 
of a concrete example. Second, there is a two-fold, slight 
displacement of perspective: instead of asking about potentially 
missing sources of support in solving conflicts, the question was 
directly about obstacles in daily work.
These differences in shade did not have a major impact on the 
results. Here as before, Hungary is the country with the least 
obstacles. The distribution of the responses, discounting the 
acquiescence bias, is almost exactly mirroring the previous. In 
Hungary, a small majority of the respondents stated that they 
rarely perceived obstacles around their work, while a much more 
considerable majority in Slovakia and especially the Czech 
Republic were complaining about such obstacles.
This picture is reinforced by the next question, asking in detail 
about the possible obstacles. On the average, Hungarian 
respondents mentioned less than two obstacles, while Czech and 
Slovak respondents two and a half. Like in the concrete case, the 
two factors that generally cause most troubles are the lack of 
proper material resources, and of a proper legal empowering. But 
in their relative importance, there is a marked change. On the 
general level, economic factors are the single most important 
sources of obstacles in all three countries. Without any difference, 
85% of respondents in each country listed the lack of material 
resources as an effective obstacle in their work; a number that is 
as close to unanimity as possible in a similar type of question. The 
lack of legal possibilities was also quite important at the general 
level, but not nearly as important as economic reasons. In the 
former Czecho-Slovakia, 2/3 of the respondents mentioned this 
factor, while in Hungary, about 50%.
In itself, this could only mean that in a more general question, 
respondents listed more factors than in a concrete case. However, 
as we have already seen, the average number of problems listed 
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emphasis on these two factors did entail a general decrease of 
mentions related to the other six possible sources. Instead of 
simply adding more and more potential sources of problems or 
conflicts at the general level, our respondents rather polarised 
their opinion: there were two overwhelming sources in all 
countries, the remaining factors being classified as accidental, 
secondary.
A detailed analysis of the rest of the responses reinforces this 
picture. References to upper level politics and national political 
parties decreased at the general level. Concerning the other, local 
factors, there is a considerable drop in the mention of the 
apparatus and especially the elected body among the sources 
obstacles, except for one case: at the general level, in the Czech 
sample, the incompetence of the apparatus was said to create 
much more troubles than in the concrete case. Here the Czech 
results deviate strikingly from the others. While related to 
concrete conflicts, problems with the apparatus were mentioned 
in the Czech republic at the same frequency than in Hungary, and 
below the Slovakian case, at the general level, it was mentioned 
more than twice as often than in either Hungary or Slovakia. The 
only other item where there was no decrease of mention, rather 
an increase in the Czech and especially the Slovak republics was, 
not surprisingly, another item with an economic reference, 
concerning local managers.
One of the most important and surprising finding so far was the 
very peculiar, erratic "behaviour" of economic matters in the 
different places of this questionnaire. When asked about the 
cleavages in the local council, economic matters are hardly 
mentioned: there are no different, conflicting, clearly formulated 
economic policy visions available in these countries. Concerning 
the concrete sources of conflict, economic factors are mentioned, 
but by no means in an overwhelming way. The insufficiency of 
material resources is a major trouble at the level of day-to-day 
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about obstacles, it suddenly becomes the standard response by 
everyone.
The following interpretation tries to explain all these responses in 
a consistent manner. Economic problems seem to be the matter of 
daily existence, the horizon, the taken for granted in the countries 
of East Europe; facts of life that exist as the ready-made 
explanation for all sorts of ills, close to the monsters in the fairy 
tale that can be freely evoked at any moment whenever 
difficulties emerge; that are so much present that nobody is 
thinking seriously about really getting rid of them for good; 
factors that even if are not the sole sources of all problems of 
daily life, are present frequently enough so that their constant 
evocation could again and again find support in daily reality. It 
would be easy to dismiss this finding by the claim that there is 
nothing specific in it; that economic matters were always and 
everywhere important. But that would be a mistake. The specific 
situation and importance, the role and place of "economic life" in 
East Europe is radically different both from that in the advanced 
Western countries, and in the countries of the Third World.
In advanced societies, economics is crucial as the basic logic of 
social and political existence. Economics is the horizon of daily life; 
it defines the rationality of daily existence, most people's attitude 
to their work and life. Economic models try, and with considerable 
success, to model human behaviour in the most different 
situations. It is often argued that by today, politics became 
nothing more than a matter of debate about the budget, and social 
relations are but generalised cases of rational choices. All this is 
debatable, of course, both on factual and ethical grounds; but it is 
beyond doubt that the rationality of economics is ever-present 
and overwhelming in all spheres of social reality, is a fundamental 
principle of the way modem societies work.
In the countries of the Third World, the situation is quite 
different. The general horizon is still defined by economic 
considerations, but it is not a question of economic rationality, but 
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Africa to Middle Asia, it is the presence, the ineradicable fact of 
poverty that marks daily existence, that strikes any external 
observer, uproots his stable beliefs, and defines the fundamental 
dividing lines in social and political life.
All this, one could say, is support for the neo-classical and Marxist 
truism that everywhere, economic matters and relations are 
predominant. But, in fact, a more precise analysis of the different 
meanings associated with the term "economic life" can help both 
to understand the specificity of the concrete situation in each 
cases, and to overcome the bias of the economic prejudice. Because 
the horizon, the taken for granted background is fundamentally 
different in all three regions. The case of East Europe can be used 
like a "conceptual catalyst" to bring to the surface and clarify this 
horizon. Let us therefore proceed by contrasting East Europe with 
the other two cases.
In the advanced countries, it is economics, its specific rationality, 
its way of handling and solving problems that is the background 
of daily existence. In East Europe, the situation is not identical, 
neither opposite, but orthogonal to it. It is not the logic of 
economics that is the taken for granted reference point, but the 
facticitv. the overwhelming, ineradicable presence of economic 
problems. This is a true "Alice in Wonderland" world, where 
everything is moving in a reverse gear. The background of daily 
existence is not a stable, logical pattern (economics), or a fact of 
daily life (poverty), but an unstable situation, a permanent crisis, 
a "problem". (27) The purpose of thinking, of intellectual work is 
not to map and solve problems, but to arrive eventually and 
always at the point when it can be shown that the question can be 
traced back to the same reason, the economic "problem" or "crisis", 
therefore remains insoluble. The standard reference to "economic" 
reasons is not a way to apply a practical, pragmatic type of 
knowledge - often even beyond its potential use -, but rather a 
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The same kind of difference can be shown by contrasting East 
Europe with the Third World. The identification of the two cases 
would be wrong on both sides of the supposed equation. On the 
one hand, the problem of East Europe is not poverty. Of course, 
some kind of poverty does exist there, as practically in all 
advanced countries. But the three phenomena cannot be identified 
in any meaningful way, at the level of socio-political analysis. In 
East Europe, the type of utmost, dire, ever-present poverty 
characteristic of most Third World countries is, apart from cases of 
war, completely absent from the contemporary scene, and was 
most probably not present in the 20th century at all. The systemic 
and systematic problems of East Europe cannot be rendered 
intelligible from the perspective of poverty or inequality.
On the other hand, poverty in the Third World is not an "economic 
problem", either in the Western or the East European sense. First, 
because it is not really a "problem" or a "difficulty" in the sense of 
a partial factor that can be isolated, diagnostised, and solved. It is 
rather an integral part of the whole of social, political, and cultural 
life. Second, it has nothing of the ritual, "mystical" characteristic of 
the East European discourse on "economic problems". It is as real 
and evident as anything can be. It is not a matter of discourse, of 
mutual and reinforcing expectations, but a basic fact of existence.
As a conclusion, we can state that economic matters are not 
primary, universal facts of reality, identical in the three major 
regions. They rather form three specific, circular systems, all of 
them following their own logic. In the West, this logic is defined 
by the way all problems are reduced to matters of pragmatic, 
economic calculation, and solved accordingly. This way of handling 
the problems can be taken to task by the limits it reaches 
(environment, culture, human personality), and its inability to 
give account of its own specificity, leading to the claim of its 
universality. In the Third World, the central element is poverty, 
and the way the fact of poverty reproduces itself, preventing to 
break the circle. (28) The East European circle is quite different. 
It is not a primary reality, rooted in poverty, but is fundamentally 
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not give a rational solution to problems, even if with certain 
limitations, but, on the contrary, is a discourse about the 
impossibility of a solution. This "economic problem", the standard 
source of popular complaints and elite reforms, is one of the 
deepest, most ingrained legacies of communism. Nothing is too 
high a price to get rid of; any shock therapy is acceptable as long 
as it destroys the trap of the background logic of the "permanent 
economic problem".
Two further points can be added to support the previous 
argument. First, among the three countries, there are enormous 
differences in the presence of unemployment. As it is well known, 
unemployment figures are much lower for the Czech than the 
Slovakian parts, while the Flungarian figures are even higher. 
These come out of the findings of the survey. In Hungary, a large 
majority, 73% of the respondents stated that unemployment 
represents a serious problem at their locality. In Slovakia, the 
number was still above 50%; but in the Czech republic, this 
problem was negligible (8%). One could expect that this leads to 
radical differences in attitudes related to economic matters. 
However, in fact, nothing of that came through in the other 
economic questions. No matter how high or low is unemployment, 
the logic of the "economic problems” reigns still sovereign in post­
communist societies.
Second, Viktor Orban, leader of FIDESZ (the Federation of Young 
Democrats), the party that is by far the most popular currently in 
Hungary, several times made recently the remark that with the 
help of a liberal government, FIDESZ would raise Hungary within 
four years to a Spanish or Portuguese level of development. (29) 
Leaving aside the issue of promises, such a statement looks devoid 
of sense. First, the per capita GNP-s of Spain and Portugal are so 
different from each other that their mentioning together would 
only prove that the statement is not to be taken seriously - 
analogous to a mistake of confusing Budapest or Bucharest, and 
therefore indicative of the distance from which the promise was 
made. (30) Second, a time horizon of four years seems to be 
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development. Still, all this becomes comprehensible if we 
interpret it as a claim about breaking the logic of the "economic 
problem". (31)
As a final point, lets call attention to a peculiar difference in the 
three countries concerning the left-overs of the former apparatus 
and the nomenclatura, at the level of both reality and ideology. 
This can be done by a joint analysis of the items related to the 
assessment of the behaviour of the elected body, the local 
managers, and the apparatus. The results are interesting, even if 
they rather just reinforce the accepted picture. It seems that in 
Hungary, both questions create only little trouble, both at the 
level of daily work and general ideas. The parts of the former 
Czecho-Slovakia, however, behave differently at both levels, and 
in a different way. At the level of concrete daily reality, neither 
the former apparatus nor the nomenclatura seem to cause much 
problem in the Czech lands - each number is practically identical 
with the respective Hungarian ones -, but both do so in Slovakia. 
At the general level, the situation is different. Here, in the Czech 
parts, the apparatus is mentioned much more as an obstacle in 
work than the former nomenclatura, while in Slovakia, the 
opposite case holds true. It suggests that the ideological debate 
about the survival of the past is cast in the language of 
"nomenclatura" in Slovakia, while in that of the "apparatus" in the 
Czech republic.
4.3. Ethnic problems
In the last few years, problems of ethnic differences and conflicts, 
the fate of ethnic minorities have suddenly sprang to the centre of 
attention. As such questions could be relevant for all three 
countries - especially for Hungary, due to the substantive 
Hungarian minorities living in the surrounding countries, and for 
Slovakia, both on account of the recent separation, and the 
presence of the Hungarian minorities - , two sets of related 
question were included in the questionnaire, about the presence 
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As Hungary, in its given borders, is thought to be a predominantly 
homogenous country, with no substantive minorities, the answers 
to the first question may look surprising: while 58% of the Slovak 
and 52% of the Czech mayors stated that there are ethnic 
minorities present in their locality, in Hungary, the answer was 
much higher, almost 70%. However, this is clarified if we look at 
the distribution according to ethnic groups. There was one group 
that was almost everywhere present wherever there were any 
minorities at all: gypsies. In Hungary, this was the only significant 
minority, present in 88% of the localities concerned, and being the 
only minority in 70% of the cases. There was no other minority 
present in more than 10% of the localities. In the former Czecho­
slovakia, there were Germans and Poles in around 20% of the 
cases, while in Slovakia, there were also Ukrainians and Russians 
in about 15% of the localities concerned, and a much more 
significant Hungarian minority (in 48% of all localities that had a 
minority at all, and in 28% of all localities).
Concerning tensions, the overall response rates where very similar 
in all countries: 55% of the Hungarian and Czech respondents, and 
50% of the Slovaks acknowledged its existence. The breakdown of 
this data into ethnic groups also revealed a coherent pattern. First 
of all, in all cases where the existence of ethnic minorities caused 
conflicts, there were gypsies present. Second, even if the other 
side of the equation does not hold up, and conflicts were not 
reported in all the localities which a gypsy population, still, this 
was mentioned in more than half of them (the exact numbers for 
the three countries are 64%, 59%, and 53%). Finally, there were 
hardly any cases where conflicts were reported in Hungary or the 
Czech republic that did not concern gypsies. Even in Slovakia, 
there was only one exception: in about 9% of the localities with 
reported Hungarian minorities, such tensions existed. Finally, let 
us mention a result that may be obvious today, but that has some 
relevance for historical reasons: there was no single case 
mentioned in any of the countries where the presence of German 
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In sum, there is one ethnic group in these East Central European 
countries who does have a very strong presence everywhere in 
the region, and which is a constant source of conflicts at the level 
of day-to-day existence: gypsies. Even if the region is quite 
heavily populated with a number of different other ethnic 
minorities, there is hardly any antagonism between them and the 
host population. Whatever conflict emerges between these groups 
is not rooted in daily existence, but is stirred from the centre. At 
the time of our survey, there was no evidence of wide-spread 
inter-ethnic hostility.
5. Links between local and national politics
Several of the questions discussed so far have already touched 
upon national issues, both related to political ideologies and the 
political structure. Now, by a few additional question, a direct 
analysis will be made about the strength of the links between 
national and local politics. Two topics are singled out for 
importance: the current party membership and voting record of 
our respondents, and their assessment of the presence of national 
political parties in local political life.
With respect to the votes cast in the first free parliamentary 
elections, the most significant result is that in all three samples, 
voting patterns were quite similar to the national averages. Just 
by the votes of the mayors, the same government would have 
won the elections in all three countries. Nevertheless, there are 
some systematic differences. In Hungary, two parties gained 
somewhat more votes (6% points each) among the mayors than 
the general populace, the Democratic Forum and the Socialists. The 
latter is due to the high degree of continuity between former 
council heads and mayors, while the former shows that it is by no 
means the case that mayors, at the change of the system, were 
hostile to the new government. The parties that gained less votes 
among them than in the general elections were the urban, liberal 
parties, the Free and the Young Democrats, which is not surprising 
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all, the governing coalition had a safe majority among the mayors, 
with 45% of the total votes; the socialist had still only 17%, while 
the liberals 25%.
The present government therefore had originally the support of 
the would-be mayors as well. But, after two and a half years in 
office, things changed considerably. Had there been a vote in the 
late Summer of 1992, the two main coalition parties would have 
suffered a serious defeat among the mayors, just like among the 
general electorate. The 31% share of the Forum would have been 
drastically reduced to 12%, and the Smallholders would not have 
even gained seats with a mere 3.5% of the votes, even in this non- 
urban sample. But this does not imply a shift to the socialist party, 
in spite of the strong former allegiance. Its share even decreased 
slightly, from 17% to 14%. Neither does it indicate a universally 
strong support for the opposition liberal parties. The main winner 
would have been, just like among the electorate at large, the 
Young Democrats: a good 25% of all those who would have gone to 
vote would have preferred them. The other liberal party, 
however, would have suffered the fate of the Forum: their shares 
would have been reduced by more than half, to a mere 6.5%. 
Finally, about the 1/4 of the mayors indicated that they did not 
have yet made up their mind.
In the Czech republic, the Civic Forum was even more strongly 
preferred by the mayors than by the general electorate, and 
would have been a safe winner. The Christian Democrats also 
gained considerably more votes among the mayors, while the 
communist party much less: in the general elections, it had a 
surprisingly strong showing, with about 13.5% of the votes, but 
among Czech mayors, only a mere 4% preferred them. In Slovakia, 
the Public Against Violence movement, and the different Christian 
Democratic groups also collected the majority of the votes among 
the mayors. However, as opposed to the Czech sample, here the 
Communist party had a very strong showing, obtaining about a 
quarter of the votes. In this way, while at the general elections, 
the communist party got exactly the same percentage of the total 
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selected six times more in Slovakia. (32) In the Czech parts, those 
with Communist sympathies were disorganised and as it were 
"hidden", while in Slovakia, they had much more presence and 
organisation at the local level, even if it was by no means 
dominant, as of 1992.
Not surprisingly among elected public officials, political 
participation was high, there being only a very small segment of 
the mayors who did not or would not go to vote. (33) Concerning 
current party membership, however, the differences were 
considerable. It is known that in Hungary, such numbers are 
extremely low, even the largest parties having only a few ten 
thousand members. This holds true for the mayors as well. In 
Hungary, only about one mayor in six was currently member of a 
political party, while in Slovakia, this number was 41%, and 
somewhat more than half of the Czech mayors (54.5%) belonged to 
a political party.
The distribution along party lines was practically the same in the 
Czech republic as in the case of voting, while it was quite different 
from the voting patterns in Hungary and Slovakia. In Hungary, not 
surprisingly, none of the mayors sampled were members of the 
Young Democrats. But, more surprisingly, the few party members 
were practically evenly distributed along the remaining five 
parties, even if the votes they received was radically different 
both in the general elections and among the mayors. No party had 
more than nine members of our sample, and any of the remaining 
five had at least six.
The Slovakian pattern was again different, but consistent with the 
difference between the voting pattern of the Slovak electorate and 
the sample of mayors. The share of the Communist Party among 
actual party members was increasing even more, to over 30%. 
This party had the single largest membership of mayors of all 
parties in Slovakia.
These data reveal marked differences in political participation 
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republic, while in Hungary, at the level of activity requiring 
something more than a mere casting of a vote, participation was 
very low by all accounts. In fact, there was no single political 
party in Hungary that would list as much as 4% of all mayors 
among its members, while in the Czech republic, 30% of the 
mayors were members of the Civic Forum, and even in Slovakia, 
apart from the 13% Communist party members, 11% belonged to 
the Public Against Violence movement, and 9% to the Christian 
Democrats.
This poses the question whether this fact is due to a general lack 
of political interest on the part of the Hungarian population. Do 
Hungarians speak less frequently and with less intensity in 
company about politics? The data, in fact, show the opposite (see 
Table 5.). In Hungary, 35% of our mayors stated that they 
regularly discussed politics in company, while this number was 
27% in the Czech sample, and a mere 13% in the Slovakian; and 
while only less then a quarter of the Hungarian sample stated that 
they rarely or never talk about politics, such numbers are higher 
in both parts of the former Czecho-Slovakia: 30% and 40%, 
respectively.
Table 5. Interest in discussions about politics
Country regularl often seldom never
Hungary 35% 41% 20% 4%
Czechy 27 42 30 1
Slovakia 13 47 36 5
Table 6. Frequency of trying to convince others
Country regularl often seldom never
Hungary 35% 48% 13% 4%
Czechy 14 46 34 5
Slovakia 11 42 37 9
The differences are even greater concerning the intensity of 
political discussions (see Table 6.). 35% of the Hungarian 
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own convictions, while the respective number is only 14% and 
11% in the Czech and Slovak republics. The same pattern is 
repeated by the opposite answers: in Hungary, there is only a 
small minority of respondents (17%) rarely or never trying to 
convince others, while close to half of them do so in the other 
countries (39% and 45%).
Next, we used two questions to tap the level and the dynamics of 
the role of national political parties in local public affairs. Both 
results fully confirm what we already found in the study of 
individual participation: the role of political activity is very' low in 
Hungary, and somewhat higher in the Czech than in the Slovak 
parts. The actual level of activity nowhere was judged very high. 
Only 11-12% of the respondents stated even in the Czech and the 
Slovak sample that the role of national political parties in the local 
affairs is either very high or rather high. The marked differences 
between the countries are at the other pole. Only 23% of the Czech 
respondents stated that national political parties play very little 
role, while this number is 31% in Slovakia, and 53% in Hungary'.
With respect to dynamics, it is no surprise that since the elections, 
political activity declined everywhere. But while in the Czech 
lands, this decline was only minor - the role of political parties 
decreased in 39% of the localities, and increased in 32% of them, in 
Slovakia, the difference is larger (44% vs. 28%), and in Hungary', 
there was a true shake-up: activity decreased in more than half 
the cases (55%), while increased only in a small minority (8%).
We asked no questions about the role political parties played at 
the time of the elections, partly because it would have been 
difficult to get reliable information, and partly to avoid 
inquisitive, circular questions. Still, by cross-tabulating the two 
available variables, it is possible to sharpen the analysis, 
especially about the possible increase or decrease of inequalities 
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Table 7. Strength and changes in local presence of political parties 
A. Hungary:
The local presence of political parties is:
Change
since very rather medium rather very (alto­
election strong strong small small gether)
in­
creased
5% 20% 55% 15% 5% 8%
no
change
1 2 19 14 64 36
de­
creased
0 1 16 30 53 55
alto­
gether
1 3 20 23 53 100
B. Czechy:
The local presence of political parties is:
Change
since very rather medium rather very (alto­
election strong strong small small gether)
in­
creased
4% 20% 43% 22% 11% 32%
no
change
3 7 38 28 25 27
de­
creased
0 0 22 47 31 39
alto­
gether
2 9 33 33 23 100
C. Slovakia:
The local presence of political parties is:
Change
since very rather medium rather very (alto­
election strong strong small small gether)
in­
creased
5% 23% 36% 23% 7% 23%
no
change
2 11 32 20 35 28
de­
creased
1 4 27 30 38 48
alto­
gether
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The role of political parties was of course higher in the localities 
where their role increased in the last years than where it 
decreased. But countries differed markedly in the pattern of the 
relative differences. In Hungary, there were very few localities 
where the role of political parties increased lately, but these were 
disproportionally more among the few localities where the role of 
political activity was relatively high than in the former Czecho­
slovakia. In the latter countries, in about a third of those localities 
where the role of political parties increased lately, their role was 
still quite minor; where in Hungary, this number was only 20%. 
The same type of relative polarisation was even more 
characteristic of the opposite end. In Hungary, this decrease 
meant a practical elimination - in 53% of these localities, parties 
play minimal role today; while in the Czech and Slovak samples, 
the respective numbers are only 31 and 38%, indicating that even 
where political activity declined, it did not disappear altogether. 
Polarisation was much stronger in Hungary than in the other 
cases; where political activity declined, it all but vanished, while 
in the few cases where it increased, it became predominant.
But the most surprising results were given by the comparative 
analysis of localities where the role of political parties remained 
constant. In the Czech and Slovakian cases, the distribution of the 
localities in this category almost perfectly reproduced the original 
frequencies. But in the Hungarian case, another even stranger 
peculiarity appears: there was a higher percentage of cases with 
minimal political activity among those localities where there was 
no change at all than where political activity actually declined. In 
other words, political activity was higher in those localities where 
it decreased than in those where it stayed the same. This can only 
be made sense if we assume a complete absence of political life in 
as much as a quarter of all Hungarian localities sampled: where 
political activity could not decrease or increase, as it did not even 
start.
This suggests that the model characterising the links between 
central and local politics in Hungary is the opposite of the Czech 
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random variations in time. (34) First, there is a "dual polity" at 
the level of the localities in Hungary, with about quarter of them 
simply not taking part in the game since the beginning. Second, 
the process of change was not random, but polarising, with a very 
small minority engaged in ever more intensive political activities, 
and another large section dropping off altogether.
6. The assessment of national politics
If this picture of the representation of national politics at the local 
level is correct, if this is the way links have been established and 
consolidated between the two levels of the polity, then this should 
find its reflection in the way mayors assessed national issues. 
There are three types of questions, often repeated in different 
surveys, therefore providing ample rooms for comparative 
analysis included in our questionnaire: left-right orientation, a 
short set of four questions on political attitudes, and overall 
satisfaction with the government.
Along the left-right ideological dimension, the huge differences 
between the three countries almost defy comprehension (see 
Table 8.). In the Czech sample, there was an extreme polarisation 
toward the right. 72% of all respondents placed themselves on the 
top four rungs toward the right, with a mere 7% leaning in the 
same manner to the left. This must be a world record of right- 
wing orientation in a national sample - such a high degree of 
polarisation perhaps could not even be found among a sample of 
voters for parliamentary conservative parties.
Table 8. Left-right scale
left right
Country 1 through 4 5 6 7 thru 10
Hungary 36% 37% 17% 9%
Czechy 7 9 12 72
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The explanation that this is just a standard post-communist 
phenomenon does not hold water as in Hungary, the situation was 
the exact opposite. In spite of the similar type of communist 
experience and its wholesale rejection in 1990, only a very small 
minority (9%) of Hungarian mayors chose the four ladders leaning 
strongly toward the right, while 36% leaned definitely to the left. 
This pattern was repeated in the two middle ladders: an 
additional 37% of respondents leaned rather toward the left, while 
only 17% toward the right.
The Slovakian results, in one sense, were mid-way between the 
other two. Altogether, exactly half the respondents expressed 
preference for both the right and the left. But, peculiarly, the 
responses were strongly polarised. Without any skew in the 
distribution, one would expect a rather strong tendency to pull 
toward the middle responses, and more caution of situating 
oneself toward the extremes. In Slovakia, the case was the 
opposite. Of the 50% opting foi* the right, only 14% chose the 
middle category, the remaining 36% situated himself or herself 
quite strongly toward the right pole; and almost the same internal 
polarisation characterised the sympathisers of the left (the actual 
numbers being 20% and 30%). Taken together, only a third of the 
respondents chose the two middle alternatives of the 10-ladder 
scale, which, in the case of a sample perfectly evenly divided 
between left and right, is almost as surprising as the one­
sidedness of the other two samples.
This points out a most peculiar situation at the level of political 
ideologies in these countries. In the Czech republic, as a response 
to the former communist system, there has emerged an extreme, 
ideologistic-doctrinaire affiliation with the right, the very word of 
the "left" being completely discredited. In Hungary, however, 
almost the opposite thing has happened. By reasons of political 
developments after the elections, mostly due to the emergence of 
a small, but very vocal extreme right, the "right" has become 
discredited. Finally, in Slovakia, the data indicate strong 
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The previous discussion moved only at the level of abstract 
political affiliation. Are these differences reproduced in concrete 
attitudinal questions, related to unemployment, welfare, and the 
environment? A review of the results of the four related items 
first shows that here, there are only two different response 
patterns, the Hungarian and Slovakian cases being practically 
identical in all counts. The Czech responses follow a neo-liberal 
orientation in all items, interpreting the meaning of "right" in the 
country accordingly. Thus, more than 70% of the respondents 
preferred fight against the inflation over the decrease of 
unemployment, while the opposite was only chosen by 17%. In 
both Hungary and Slovakia, by a margin of about 50% vs. 40%, 
preference went to the fight against unemployment. This can still 
be explained by referring to the actual situation, the much lower 
rate of unemployment in the Czech lands. However, the same 
differences were maintained in the other responses. Practically all 
Czech respondents (92%) agreed that there should be no upper 
limit to the money one can earn, while Hungarians and Slovaks 
were more cautious in agreeing (around 70%). The results of the 
question about governmental role in medical care were even more 
revealing. For mayors in Hungary and Slovakia, the choice was 
clear: preference for free medical care was chosen by a 7 to 2 
margin. For Czechs, this choice evidently created a lot of troubles. 
Given their ideological orientation, many of them did not even 
want to hear about governmental help - only slightly more than a 
third of the respondents opted for this alternative. But most of 
them could not really swallow the idea that everyone should pay 
for their own medical bills either - this alternative was only 
chosen by another 1/3-plus. This left us with a very huge 
proportion of Czech respondents (23%) failing to answer this 
question. Finally, the overwhelming majority of respondents 
agreed in all countries that the protection of the environment is to 
be given preference, even at the price of a loss of work-places, the 
differences only being in the relative ratios (the odds being 7 to 2 
in Hungary and Slovakia, and 8 to 1 in the Czech republic).
Finally, connecting back to the questions posed before about the 
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included the standard item on the evaluation of the government. 
Here, again, the differences were very strong between all three 
countries. Like always, Czech and Hungarian responses were the 
furthest from each other, with the Slovakian in between, but 
closer now to the Czech case (see Table 9.).
Table 9. Satisfaction with the government
dissatisfied satisfied
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
HU 7% 10% 21% 13% 26% 10% 7% 6% 1% 1%
CZ 2 4 9 13 13 11 21 17 8 2
SL 6 8 11 10 20 15 8 15 5 2
Considering that we are talking about the first democratically 
elected government for well over 40 years in these countries, it is 
surprising that satisfaction with the government was nowhere 
very high, although this can me rendered somewhat intelligible 
both by the difficulties these governments had to face, and a 
peculiar legacy of communism: the indiscriminate blaming of 
"those above". Among Czech mayors, there was a clear majority 
expressing satisfaction (59%). Within this category, there was a 
peculiar inversion, a disproportional number being quite strongly 
happy with the government: there were much more respondents 
choosing the 7th and the 8th ladder than the 6th, creating an 
unusual bi-modal distribution. The respondents in Slovakia were 
much less satisfied, but still gave a decent rating of their 
government (46% satisfied, 54% not satisfied), with a response 
distribution similar to the Czech, showing polarisation both on the 
satisfied and the non-satisfied pole. One can sum up these results 
by stating that our respondents had rather strong sentiments 
about the performance of their government, whether good or bad, 
and that in the Czech sample, there was a definite preponderance 
of those who were satisfied, while in the Slovakian, the balance 



























































































-  50  -
No such nuances were present in the Hungarian sample: a mere 
24% expressed some degree of satisfaction, while 76% were 
dissatisfied. The internal distribution was also significant, showing 
that the picture drawn by the mayors was not altogether 
dismissive. First, comparing the extreme poles to the Czech and 
Slovak results, we can see that the top two categories are 
practically missing from Hungary: only 1.6% of all respondents 
gave 9 or 10 "points" to the government, while in the other 
countries, such high marks were given by considerably more 
respondents (9.6% and 7.0%). But in the bottom two ladders, the 
differences were much smaller. In Hungary, 16.3% of the 
respondents had such a low opinion of the performance of the 
government, while in the two parts of the former Czecho-Slovakia, 
it was 6.0 and 13.6% respectively. Thus, while in terms of overall 
evaluation, the Czech and Slovak results were quite close to each 
other and different from the Hungarian, in this particular case, 
there is much more similarity between the Slovakian and the 
Hungarian data.
This difference can be explained in a manner consistent with the 
findings analysed so far. Giving such a low mark reveals a deep- 
seated hostility, as it is hardly conceivable that an unprejudiced 
person would give a similar rating to the first democratically 
elected government of his country. Two reasons could explain this 
choice. This number may give an indication of the presence of 
former, truly communist leaders among mayors, who never for a 
minute supported the changes, and use all occasion to blame the 
new system. But these could also be persons who became most 
disappointed with the new system; who entertained very high, 
illusory hopes, and were the most irritated by the failure of their 
realisation. As the results show, while both these categories were 
all but absent from the Czech sample, they were present in almost 
the same manner in Hungary and Slovakia. The point is that this 
does not explain the wide difference at the level of the overall 
assessment of the government not only between Hungary and the 
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The heart of this difference between Hungary and the other two 
countries is not at the two bottom ladder, but in ladders 3, 4, and 
5. Taken altogether, 60% of the mayors in the Hungarian sample 
evaluated the performance of their government in this, 
moderately dissatisfied way, while the respective numbers are 
35% and 41% in the other two countries. Like voting behaviour, 
this indicates that a chance was given to the government, but it 
could not capitalise on it, failing so blatantly that it was unable to 
build up even a faint basis of support among mayors. Though 
obtained about half the votes of the mayors during the elections, 
only 24% of them were relatively satisfied with its performance 
after two and a half years in office. Also, while in both the Czech 
and Slovak republics, not only the average rate of satisfaction was 
higher, but there was a marked increase toward the top rungs on 
the ladder, indicating the presence of a very supportive 
contingent (in rungs 7 and 8, in both samples, there was a strong 
second mode), in Hungary, 10 % of the 24% satisfied with the 
government opted for the lowest possibility, and the remaining 
were divided between rungs 7 and 8, with practically none 
remaining at the upper rungs.
On the basis of a detailed analysis of the data distribution, we can 
therefore say much more about the Hungarian case than simply 
stating a high level of dissatisfaction. In spite of their past record 
(many former communist party members and heads of local 
councils) that many hold against them, mayors were not at all 
hostile to the new government from the start, and most were not 
enemies even at the time of this survey. But hardly anyone today 
can be listed among its supporters. The government failed to 
capitalise on the proper moment to build up a basis for its policies 
at this crucial level of polity. This proved to be a fatal error. Due 
to this lack of a stable basis, the government could not mobilise 
support for its policies that would have helped him to get through 
the difficulties. This increased its sense of paranoia, the feeling of 
being surrounded with hostility. Again and again, the wrong 
answer was given to this problem: instead of targeting those 
individuals that have a decisive voice in the local communities, it 
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central media. Due to reasons that are difficult to understand, it 
mistook the reality of Hungary to a fantasy-image of a "wired 
world", where the impact of electronic media is all-powerful, and 
there are no local voices of influence. The lesson suggested by our 
study is that instead of worrying about the TV, the government 
should have bothered itself with mayors, and the needs and 
opinions of localities.
7. Overall assessments of the iob
Two topics will serve to finish the overview: self-evaluation of the 
overall level of satisfaction, and a few questions about the point of 
exit.
7.1. Overall level of satisfaction
Just considering the present as a single point in time, the 
differences between the three countries are not very great (see 
Table 10.). The Czech and the Slovak distributions are practically 
identical, with over 70% of the respondents being rather satisfied 
with their life, while this number is a little over 60% in Hungary. 
In international comparison, the first reaches the overall level of 
satisfaction of the Catholic, Latin countries (France, Italy, Spain), 
while the latter falls below.
Concerning the level of satisfaction as of five years ago, the 
differences become greater, and the relationship between the 
three countries is changed. It is now Hungary and Slovakia that 
are very close, with about 60% of the respondents leaning toward 
satisfaction with their life as of five years ago. (35) Czech mayors 
presented a very bleak picture of their former life. Those 
dissatisfied outweighed the satisfied with a margin of almost 3 to 
2, and 32% of all respondents placed themselves at the three 
bottom rungs. The structure of the responses on expected 
satisfaction five years from now is quite close to the distribution 
related to the past, only the sign of the differences are changed. 
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again, with 70 and 75% projecting a satisfactory life for that time 
horizon, while the Czechs are radiating with optimism, with 88% 
thinking that they will be satisfied with their life by that period, 
64.5% even placing themselves at the top three rungs.
Table 10. Overall satisfaction with life
A. Hungary:
dissatisfied 
1 through 4 5 6
satisfied 
7 thru 10
5 yrs ago 20% 18% 15% 48%
Now 19 18 15 48
In 5 yrs 15 15 14 56
B. Czechy:
dissatisfied 
1 through 4 5 6
satisfied 
7 thru 10
5 yrs ago 43% 16% 10% 32%
Now 17 11 14 57
In 5 yrs 6 7 8 80
C. Slovakia:
dissatisfied 
1 through 4 5 6
satisfied 
7 thru10
5 yrs ago 4% 12% 12% 51%
Now 11 8 16 58
In 5 yrs 16 9 13 62
The study of the internal dynamics of the three countries 
complements the previous assessment, adding some clarification 
and colour. Czechs live in a fairy tale, projecting a wholesale 
transformation from the realm of gloom to Paradise. As an 
illustration, only 31.8% of the sample said that they were quite 
satisfied with their life 5 years ago (the sum of the four top 
rungs); as of today, this number jumped to 57.6%; while 80.1% of 
them hope that they will be so satisfied five years from now. (36) 
The dynamics of the Hungarian and the Slovak cases differs from 
the Czech, but also somewhat from each other. The Hungarian 
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concerning the changes: the distribution of the present level of 
satisfaction and that retrojected to five years ago are practically 
identical. However, there is a hope that perhaps, in five years, the 
situation will change. In Slovakia, compared to five years ago, 
there is a definite increase in the level of satisfaction, but very 
little improvement is expected in the next five years.
7.2. The point of exit
One would expect that the overall level of satisfaction with one's 
present life should have a lot to do with answering the question 
whether one would accept again the offer of becoming a mayor. It 
may well be the case at the individual level, but does not hold 
true for country averages. We have seen that Hungarian mayors 
were relatively the least satisfied with their present life; yet, they 
are the ones who would accept again the offer by the highest 
proportion (69% vs. 28%). In the Czech sample, a much smaller 
number answered this question with a clear yes (54% vs. 31%); 
while among Slovakian mayors, the number of refusals also 
increased considerably, to 37% (with 48% still accepting). (37)
While the previous question asked about the demand side, the 
second thoughts mayors may have about accepting the job, the 
next tried to tap the supply side, the possible pool of candidates, 
asking whether it would be easy to replace them. There was a 
marked difference here in no answers: while 10% of Hungarian 
respondents could not answer this question, in the Czech sample, 
it went up to 20%, and in Slovakia, to 28%. The pattern of valid 
answers was also dissimilar. In Slovakia, the 'yes' answers 
outweighed the 'no' by a ratio of five to one; in the Czech republic, 
this was only three to one, while in Hungary, a mere three to two. 
Even keeping in mind the high ratio of missing responses, this still 
suggests that in Slovakia, such a replacement would be easy in the 
majority of cases; in the Czech republic, more difficulties would 
emerge; while in Hungary, such a replacement would be often 
quite difficult. Many of the mayors in Hungary should be 
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not simply due to their outstanding qualities, but as nobody else 
could be found to take up the job.
Finally, about 30-35% of the respondents claimed that at the end 
of their term, they would start their own business. Here, missing 
responses were again quite high in the former Czecho-Slovakia 
(22-24%).
8. Concluding remarks
Throughout the paper, whenever matters connected to 
professional expertise, the level of familiarity with the market 
economy, or the acuteness of concrete, actual, pragmatic 
difficulties arose, the advantage of Hungary with respect to the 
other countries were clear-cut. Whether the question was about 
the reference to new, economic expertise vs. traditional, legal 
knowledge (p.16), the surprises encountered first at the job (ZZZ 
p.20), the solution of conflicts (p.27), the average number of 
obstacles encountered (p.28), the troubles caused by the legacy of 
the former nomenclatura or the apparatus (p.34), or second 
thoughts about accepting again the invitation to run (p.48), the 
answers indicate that the process of change was much smoother, 
the difficulties encountered less numerous and serious in Hungary 
than in the other countries. If we only take a snapshot, without 
considering the dynamics or looking beyond the surface, Hungary 
seems to offer definite advantages over the two other countries. 
This is reflected in the fact that in the first few years after 1989, 
foreign capital investment in Hungary was much higher than in 
any other of the countries.
If, however, we take a careful look, the picture becomes less 
convincing. First of all, the idea according to which in Hungary, all 
problems can now be reduced to mere matters of professional 
expertise looks doubtful. Certainly, the economic liberalisation 
that happened in the Kâdâr régime makes the transition to a 
market economy easier in certain respects. But it is difficult to 
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completely emptied out from the inside, and with the collapse of 
the political system, its effects will vanish into thin air. A number 
of findings of the study support this doubt.
First, a situation where the solution of economic and political 
problems requires only expertise assumes a polity united on some 
basic principles, and showing strong and clear dividing lines on 
issues of alternative policies. The East European picture drawn 
from this study, and especially in Hungary, looks the opposite. 
Mayors wish to present a picture of the whole community as 
united, and yet, when facing the concrete problems to solve, the 
elected bodies seem paralysed in front of the spectre of the 
"economic problem". There is not even a discussion of alternative 
policies, the very idea of policy-making at the local level seems 
lacking. (38) On the other hand, there is no political life either, 
apart from personal conflicts, or pale reflections of some national 
political debates.
This suggests that even in Hungary, the question at stake is more 
than a simple continuation of the road started in 1968; it is the 
creation of the foundations and frameworks of a new order, a new 
polity. This is certainly not going to be accomplished in a few 
years. The problem is that our data indicate that in the countries 
sampled, and again especially in Hungary, it is highly doubtful 
whether the first steps were taken in the right direction.
Perhaps the most crucial element in the re-building of the polity 
is the presence of a certain kind of political will. This is not at all 
meant in Rousseaus sense of the formulation of common goals, of 
preaching about consensus and solidarity, of the positing of a new, 
small elite into the role of the law-giver and the prophet, but a 
widespread and shared will to take part in the solution of the 
common problems and conflicts at all levels of the polity; a desire 
to be active, pragmatic, energetic, rational, clear-headed; a refusal 
of the search for overall notions of unity, and of the emotional, 
intolerant, and exclusive style of politisation so characteristic of 
the former systems. It is this political will that, as our findings 
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If we look at the characteristics mayors think particularly 
important for their job, we find a predominance of the old style of 
"pastoral" characteristics, and a marginalisation of activity and 
pragmatism. A mayor needs qualities to hear and bear the 
complaints of his herd, and not energy and imagination to stand 
up to the tasks. But the clearest example concerns the peculiar 
link (or rather, its absence) between activity and thought in 
politics.
Whenever people get together in East Europe, whether in the 
family, in the work-place, or among friends, they discuss politics. 
But actual participation in the political life is extremely low. 
Politics is "their" business, about which "we" can only talk. The 
proof that the discussion about politics is not translated into 
activity is the wide gap between thinking about taking up a public 
office, and actual participation in local public affairs. Still today, 
people are rather pulled into public participation with a 
considerable force, and would not even think of this as a 
possibility on their own. On the part of most people, taking up a 
public or political office is not the result of careful premeditation, 
but an act of fate that one could not avoid; as if the very idea of 
participating in politics would be evil.
All this points towards two connected themes that should be the 
objects of careful theoretical analysis in future studies. The first is 
the gap between the self and the other that predominates East 
European polities. It is the harmonisation of this link that, with 
the help of techniques like the market, policy-making, or 
normalising education, lies at the heart of the construction of the 
modern Western polities; successful to such a large extent that its 
very success creates problems on its own, by the threat posed to 
the autonomy of both the individual selves and of different 
cultures. The problem in East Europe is the exact opposite, the 
appealing lack of connection. This is the driving force behind the 
current processes of fragmentation, nationalism, isolation, apathy, 
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The second point concerns something that, following Weber, could 
be called the "spirit of democracy". This paper will not offer a 
definition of this spirit, and would only point out that the gap that 
was discovered between the self and the other may exactly be 
due to the lack of this "spirit" in East Europe. An analysis of this 
"spirit" should follow the proper methods of Weber, by separating 
it from the similar attitudes of equalitarianism, levelling, and 
resentment, and by focusing on the micro level, on what made the 
establishment of democracy possible at the level of daily life and 
subjectivity in the Western countries, searching for the 
substantive techniques of democracy that are assumed by studies 
focusing either on political institutions, or the market. It is here 
that, as the other part of the project argues in detail, the last, 
unpublished lectures of Michel Foucault given between 1982 and 
1984 about techniques of the self and parrhesia (the courage of 
truth-telling), and the promised theme of the "true life", especially 
when read and used together with other authors like Weber, Elias, 
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Notes
( 1 ) Though, for various reasons, much less interest was raised in 
sociology, especially social theory. This is all the more surprising 
as it was the need to explain such changes beyond referring to 
political events that led to the emergence of sociology. For a 
difference, see Adam Przeworski: Democracy and the Market 
(Cambridge Univ Press, 1991), though it only underlines one's 
doubts about the usefulness of a rational choice approach to the 
current dilemmas of East Europe.
(2) From the vast body of literature, let us only single out the 
works of Juan Linz, José Maravall, Geoffrey Pridham, and Philippe 
Schmitter.
(3) See Jadviga Staniszkis, The Dynamics o f Breakthrough in 
Eastern Europe, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991).
(4) The few optimistic scenarios have some peculiar 
commonalties: they are mostly written by economists, and in the 
United Kingdom. A careful reading of these pieces, however, 
shows that they have as much to do with East Europe as 
Montesquieu's Persian Letters with Persia. See the famous article 
in the Financial Times on the reorganisation of centre and 
periphery in Europe, and the Economist, 13 March 1993, special 
survey following p. 64.
(5) Thus, his collected essays appeared in two separate volumes 
bearing the title Diagnoses (Budapest, Magvetô, 1982 and 1986), 
and as a background, he put a large emphasis on the literature on 
social pathology.
(6) Such a linguistic exercise may seem far-fetched, but here, as 
often, the use of words, whether consciously intended or not, can 
tell more about at once essential and fine aspects of the problem 
than a lengthy essay or an expensive and time-consuming 
empirical study.
(7) The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. 13, p. 508.
(8) The word "regime" is often used explicitly in East Europe, but 
even the term "system" is closer to this meaning there than its 
Western use. For a recent example, see the demonstrators against 
the "regime of Eltsin" on the title page of the International Herald 
Tribune. (IHT, 24-25 April, 1993, p.l).
(9) See Seneca's Letter 52, 'On Choosing our teachers'. This 
discussion has been very strongly influenced by the 1982 lectures 
given by Michel Foucault at the Collège de France. See especially 
the lecture of 27 January 1982.
(10) This was the title of a famous book written by a former 
Hungarian communist living through the Stalinist period in the 
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[blows] a leaf)- This metaphor was also widespread in the early 
Christian literature.
(11) As a particularly revealing example, see the case of the 
VGMK-s (self-accounting teams at state-owned enterprises), one 
of the sacred cows of the reform economists, introduced in the 
early 1980s. The intention was dual: to legalise some of the 
activity done in the second economy, and to introduce some 
elements of enterpreneurship into the state sector. The result was 
quite different: the provision of a legal value to simple theft and 
bribery; to stabilise the growing conviction of a large segment of 
the population that "reform" and "markets" are only synonyms for 
personal enrichment through corruption; an indication that times 
may change (the role of the party is diminishing), but the rules of 
the game stay the same. VGMK-s had a crucial role in the 
thorough de-moralisation of Hungary.
(12) For related publications, see Agnes Horvath and Arpâd 
Szakolczai: The Dissolution o f Communist Power: The Case o f in 
Hungary (London, Routledge, 1992); Arpâd Szakolczai, 'Weber et 
la méthode généalogique', Magazine Littéraire, 1992, no. 298; 'On 
the Exercise of Power in Modem Societies, East and West', EUI 
Working Papers, 1992; Nietzsche's Genealogical Method: 
Presentation and Application', EUI Working Papers, 1993; and 
'From Govemmentality to the Genealogy of Subjectivity: On 
Foucault's path in the 1980's', EUI Working Papers, 1993.
(13) On the basis of 31 interviews conducted in the Summer of 
1991 in Hungary and Slovakia by members of the local elite, 
mostly newly elected mayors, a questionnaire was constructed to 
tap various areas of local political, and the social and political 
background and the value orientations of the mayors. This 
questionnaire was asked in July-September 1992 by 
professionally trained interviewers on 250 mayors in Hungary, 
the Czech republic, and Slovakia. The actual number of cases were 
246, 257, and 243, respectively. See also 'Types of Mayors, Types 
of Subjectivity: Continuity and Discontinuity in the East-Central 
European Transitions 1', EUI Working Papers, 1993.
(14) Thus, for e.g., studies on voting behaviour in Hungary have 
shown very little impact by the social background variables. See 
for e.g., the works of Kolosi and Szelényi.
(15) See the related works of Hankiss and Bruszt.
(16) See Gâbor Péteri (ed), Local Democracy and Innovation: The 
first steps of local transition in East-Central Europe (Budapest, Ld 
& I Foundation, 1991).
(17) This is especially surprising as in countries with a strong 
mayoral system (for e.g., France), such a position is considered 



























































































- 6 1 -
(18) See Agnes Horvath and Arpâd Szakolczai: The Dissolution of 
Communist Power, 1992.
(19) Probably everybody in Hungary could tell stories about the 
selection of pioneer or KISZ leaders from the 1970s on, to show 
that while officially, the taking up of such positions was 
considered to be a great privilege, the actual choice was in fact 
quite different. To give a concrete example from 1970-71, when 
such a choice had to be made in my school by 12-13 year old 
students, we selected as our "leader" a boy who came to our school 
just a few months ago, had the reputation of being a bit "difficult", 
and was actually absent when the nomination was made. All this 
happened in what was considered as one of the best schools in the 
country. In Italy, a similar choice even today, when the Italian 
political life is considered to be on the brink of collapse, is a 
matter of utmost prestige in a school-class. And let us just add a 
recent example from Hungary, as it was told in an interview with 
the newly appointed political secretary of state of the Ministry of 
Finances. The point is worth a full quotation:
Q. "You have explained your catholic activity, but not yet the 
political... "
A. "This has its own story. At one time, the leadership of 
KIM (the catholic youth movement) decided that one 
member of the organisation should participate at the 
elections. I was just undergoing an operation. What happens 
in such cases? They always think of those who are not 
present." See HVG, 13 March 1993, p.98.
Thus, in a full account of the personal motivation of entry' into 
politics given in Spring 1993, just by a change of letter (KIM to 
KISZ), the statement loses its specificity, and becomes possible to 
utter at any time since 1957.
(20) In a talk given in Florence in 2 March 1993, Andras Kovâcs, 
political advisor to FIDESZ indicated that in case of winning the 
election, one of their top priorities would be the drafting of a new 
constitution.
(21) On democracy and ascendancy, see Foucault's course of 1983 
at the Collège de France, especially 2 and 9 February. See also 
Moses Finley, Politics in the Ancient World (Cambridge U. P., 
1983).
(22) It is worthwhile to remember that the country that was the 
closest to the West for several decades, and was the secret hope of 
the other East European countries, was Yugoslavia. As a last 
reference to the advanced status of Yugoslavia, see the article by 
Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton, '"Shock therapy" and real 
incomes', Financial Times, 29 January 1991.
(23) The debate between Eltsin and the Russian Parliament 




























































































communist" mayors in Hungary and especially Slovakia the 
second. See Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (to be 
published by Routledge in 1993)
(24) In order to get valid results, the item was stated using very 
strong terms. The exact wording was the following: "the council 
meetings are very long, as there are very many superfluous, 
meaningless interventions."
(25) See Susan Welch and Timothy Bledsoe, Survey o f Council 
Members in Large American Cities, 1982 , ICPSR 8655 (Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, 1987).
(26) This is the sense in which politics, since its emergence in 
Athens in the 7-5 th centuries BC., was always a matter of 
invention.
(27) A capitalist market economy encounters periodical crises; a 
backward country lacks any economic dynamics; but a socialist 
economy was in a permanent state of crisis, this being the very 
concrete and real meaning of the "permanent revolution” thesis.
(28) This circle has been analysed in several classical works in 
the literature on economic development. See especially the works 
of Hirschman, Myrdal, and Nurkse.
(29) See HVG, 17 April, 1993, p. 98.
(30) The per capita GNP in 1990 in Spain was 10.925 USD, in 
Portugal 8136 USD. See Eurostat 1992: Basic Statistics of the 
Community (Luxemburg, 1992).
(31) This is one of the many reasons why FIDESZ is so weary of 
teaming up with the Free Democrats.
(32) In the Czech parts, 13.5% in the House of People, and 13.8% 
in the House of Nations; while in the Slovak parts, as if only the 
numbers were changed, 13.8% in the House of People, and 13.4% 
in the House of Nations. See Gordon Wightman, 'Czechoslovakia', in 
Electoral Studies 9 (1990), 4: 319-26.
(33) The exact numbers are 89% in Hungary, 95% in the Czech 
lands, and 89% in Slovakia.
(34) Though the meaning is merely descriptive, I am willing to 
put values to it.
(35) Incidentally, this distribution is identical to the response 
members of the party apparatus gave in 1988 about the situation 
of their life as of five years ago.
(36) It may again be instructive to compare these results with 
the dynamics of the responses of the party instructors in 1988. 
According to them, five years ago, they lived an "average" level of 
happiness by cadres in the system of existing socialism. In 
September 1988, when they knew only too well how close they 
are to the end, their level of satisfaction was extremely low, only 
slightly better than the dismal picture out Czech respondents 




























































































respondents being more satisfied than dissatisfied. But, as 
opposed to our present respondents, they did not see at that time 
much hope of improvement for the future either: the level of 
expected satisfaction only went up to 53% in the horizon of five 
years.
(37) Some of the differences may also be dueto the fact that the 
number of missing responses was not the same throughout - 4% in 
Hungary', 15% in the two parts of the former Czecho-Slovakia.
(38) This assessment is based not only on the survey, but also the 
interviews.
(39) About this, see also the working paper entitled 'Types of 
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